Lessons from the heterodox stabilization programs by Kiguel, Miguel A. & Liviatan, Nissan
Policy,  Research,  and  External  Affairs
WORKING  PAPERS
L Macroeoonomic  Adjustment
L_  _  ~and  Growth 
Country  Economics  Department







Miguel  A. Kiguel
and
Nissan  Liviatan
Heterodox stabilization programs are more successful in chronic
high inflation countries because only there can the benefits from
achieving a rapid initial reduction in inflation outweigh the costs
of tampering with price and wage controls. While the heterodox
phase is effective in blocking inflation initially, success depends
on a long-term commitment to the orthodox part of the program
and the readiness to accept the unavoidable costs of disinflation.
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This paper draws lessons on the advantages and  program of 1985 and Mlexico's Pacto de
disadvantages of the heterodox stabilization  Solidaridad of 1987-88. In bothi  cases thcse
approach in chronic high inflation countries.  programs were followed by a seconid,  more
Heterodox stabilization programs make tempo-  orthodox stagc and included thc use ol' the
rary use of income policies -price  and wage  exchange rate as the nominal anchior. While thc
controls - to support orthodox policies.  The  programs succeeded, both experienced costs in
evaluatioi  . based on heterodox programs - the form of an appreciationl  of the real exchanige
successful and unsuccessful oncs -from  the  rate and highl  real intlerest  rates.
1960s and 1980s in Latin American countrics
and Israel.  The main lessons fromii  the experiences
analyzed by Kiguel and Liviatlan  arc:
Orthodox stabilization programs normally
involve a tight fiscal policy, a fixed exchangc  *  The initial, rapid reduction in iniflationi
rate, and sometimes tight monetary policy. The  (which usually comes about with small costs) at
programs have proved their worth under differ-  the beginning of heterodox progranms  is the easy
ent conditions, including low and moderatc  part; the difflicult  part is to maintain price
inflation (Costa Rica and the Philippines in the  stability over time.
early  1980s) and hyperinflation (Bolivia in
1985). The orthodox approach has been less  *  Incomc policies in heterodox stabilization
successful in chronic high inflation countrics-  programs are only justified in highi  chroniic
as demonstrated by Mexico's experience in  inflation countries 'countries with annual rates of
1982-83, where a drastic reduction in the budget  inflation above 100 percent) where inflationary
deficit was accompanied by a large increase in  persistence is more pervasive and pr-oblematic.
inflation.
Therc is a case  for a larger  fiscal adiustmenit
Kiguel and Liviatan argue that inflationary  in heterodox programs than in orthlodox  pro-
rigidities, in an economy with chronic high  grams because of the risk that a  povemment that
inflation, can be quickly overcome by using  starts with price controls could be confused with
income policies.  Their main role is to deal with  one that tries to achieve price stability without
pessimistic expectations about inflation in  adjusting.
situations wherc the government announces and
makes a fiscal adjustment, but private agents do  *  A heterodox program that faiils  is likely to
not fully believe it and set prices accordingly.  lcad to larger inflation instability than an ortho-
dox program that fails.
Heterodox programs were successfully tried
in two chronic high inflation countries, Israel's
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There  are  usually  considerable  difficulties  in stopping  inflation  in
chronic  high inflation  countries  when they  followed  the  orthodox  approach
(see  Kiguel  and  Liviatan  1988). Disinflation  is usually  slow  in these  cases,
and results  in large  costs  in  terms  of unemployment. Heterodox  programs  were
devised  as an alternative,  more effective  way of bringing  down inflation  in
these  countries. The  purpose  of this  paper  is to draw lessons  on the
advantages  and  disadvantages  of the  heterodox  stabilization  approach  in
chronic  high inflation  countries. Heterodox  stabilization  programs  are those
that  combine  tight  fiscal  policy,  a fixed  exchange  rate,  and price  and  wage
controls. The first  two  elements  are also  part  of exchange  rate  based
orthodox  stabilization  programs. What separates  orthodox  from  heterodox
programs  is the  use of income  policies  as a temporary  device  for  the  purpose
of bringing  down inflation.
Two rqcent  heterodox  programs  are those  of Israel  in  1985 and  the
Mexican  Pacto  de Solidaridad  of late  1987.  In these  two  cases  the  fiscal
adjustment  was undertaken  and  maintained  throughout,  the  exchange  rate  was
used as the  main nominal  anchor  from  the  outset,  and  price  and  wage controls
were introduced  to support  a rapid  initial  reduction  in inflation. Both
programs  have succeeded  in  maintaining  low  inflation  for  an extended  period
thus  giving  support  to the  argument  that  under  the  right  circumstances  the2
heterodox  approach  can  be a  viable  alternative  to bring  dowr,  inflation. As
controls  were removed  over time,  the  two  programs  converged  to exchange  rate
based  orthodox  stabilizations  of the  type  used in  Chile in the  late
seventies.
Most of the existing  works  on heterodox  programs,  including  Bruno  et.
al. (1988),  Ocampo  (1987)  and  Alberro  and  Ibarra  (1987),  have focused  on
issues  and  problems  that  appear  in  the initial  stage  of the  programs.'
Because  most of these  works  evaluated  these  programs  based  on the  record  of
the first  or at best the  secord  year,  the  evaluation  was based  on a
relatively  short  term  horizon,  and  hence  they  overlooked  some  of their  longer
term  consequences. Thus,  the  main lessons  that  one finds  in the  existing
literature 2 only  provide  a partial  evaluation  of heterodox  programs. By and
large,  the  view at that  time  was that (i)  price  and  wage controls  can  be
useful  to support  disinflation  initially  when the  inflation  process  displays
"inertia".  (ii)  the  initial  costs  of bringing  down inflaticn  in this  way are
usually  small  compared  to those  in orthodox  programs,  and (Lii)  the success
of a heterodox  program  in the  longer  term  primarily  depends  on  maintaining
the fiscal  adjustment  (the  orthodox  part)  throughout.
In this  paper  we broaden  the  understanding  of heterodox  programs  by
concentrating  on the  medium  and long  term implications  of starting  a
stabilization  program  through  a heterodox  phase. Our  working  hypothesis  is
that the  so called  heterodox  programs  are  just  the first  stage  of a long term
stabilization  effort. Eventually,  price  and  wage controls  are removed  and
I  See  also Blejer  and  Cheasty  (1988),  Heymann (1987),  Cardoso  and
Dornbusch  (1987),  Fischer  (1987),  etc.
2  See for  example  Bruno  et.  al (1988),  etc.3
stabilization  proceeds  in  the  second  stage  along  orthodox  lines.  Typically,
the  exchange  rate  becomes  the  main  nominal  anchor  in  the  second  stage,  and
hence  the  progrmz  becomes  an  orthodox  exchange  rate  based  stabilization.
Once  the  programs  are  analyzed  from  this  perspective  a  number  of
questions  arise  which  xre  not  addressed  in  the  existing  literature.  First,
there  is  a  need  to  understand  in  which  ways,  if  any,  are  the  prospects  for
stabilization  enhanced  by  reducing  inflation  quickly,  early  on  through  the
use  of  price  and  wage  controls.  This  issue  is  important  because  the
rationale  for  using  controls  is  that  orthodox  pro-7ams  do  not  succeed  in
bringing  down inflation  quickly  in  chronic  high  inflation  economies.  In  this
paper  we argue  that  there  are  two  potential  benefitst  (i)  the  initial
improvement  in  the  fiscal  accounts  resulting  from  the  reverse  of  the  Olivera-
Tanzi  effect,  and  (ii)  the  initial  grace period  in  terms  of  low  inflation
during  which  the  government  can  show its  commitment  to  eliminate  the  budget
deficit  in  a suastainable  way.
A second,  related,  issue  is  to  understand  the  costs  that  using  atrols
in  the  first  stage  entail  for  later  developments.  We  want  to  go  beyond  the
possible  distortions  in  the  allocation  of  resources  arising  from  using
controls  in  the  first  stage  (which  in  our  view  are  not  that  important  in
these  programs). A more  relevant  issue  is  the  way  in  which  the  credibility
of  the  government  can  be  damaged  in  the  longer  term  by  using  controls  to
avoid  a  recession  in  the  first  stage  of  disinflation.  Since  the  government
did  not establish  its  willingness  to  accept  the  costs  associated  with
bringing  down  inflation  through  orthodox  methods,  opting  instead  for  the  use
of  controls,  the  question  remains  as  to  whether  it  will  be  willing  to  accept
these  costs  later  on. If  this  is  the  case,  what  difficulties  is  the4
government  likely  to  face  later  on?
de  inclusion  of income  policies  is the  main reason  that  makes
'heterodox  stabilization  programs  controversial.  The  skepticism  about  the  use
of  controls  in  stabilization  is  partly  related  to  their  frequent  misuse  in
populist  programs  (see  Dornbusch  and  Edwards  (1989)),  which  use  controls  as  a
way  to  bring  down  inflation  while  avoiding  any  adjustment  in  the
fundamentals,  and  to  the  potential  distortions  that  they  could  introduce  in
the  allocation  of  resources.  In  fact,  many  economists  would  argue  that  the
elimination  of  the  budget  deficit  in  a  sustained  way  is  all  that  is  needed  to
bring  down  inflation;  whether  or  not  controls  are  used  is  irrelevant,
controls  could  be  used  in  these  cases  but  they  would  not  serve  any  useful
role. The  empirical  evidence,  however,  shows  that  a  reduction  in  the  budget
deficit,  while  necessary,  is  not  sufficient  for  bringing  down  inflation  in
the  short,  or  even  in  the  medium  run. Price  and  wage  controls  are  not
necessarily  the  solution  for  this  problem.  Nevertheless,  there  are  specific
circumstances  iu  which  the  heterodox  approacL  can  be  the  right  way  to  go.
The  paper  will  be  organized  as  follows.  In  section  II  we  will
introduce  the  programs  that  will  Se  included  in  this  study.  We  include
successful  as  well as unsuccessful  programs.  The core  of our sample  are  the
beterodox  programs  of  the  eighties  in  Latin  America  and  Israel,  although  we
will  also  make  reference  to  some  important  income  policies  based
stabilizations  $mplemented  in  the  sixties  in  Latin  America.3  In  section  III
we  discuss  the  inflationary  rigidities  (inertial  inflation)  observed  in
chronic  high  inflation  countries,  and  the  difficulties  it  creates  for  the
I  These  programs  are  described  in  more  detailed  in  Kiguel  and  Liviatan
(1989).5
orthodox  approach. In section  IV  we discuss  the  effectiveness  of income
policies  to oveL\.ome  these  rigidities,  and  the  advantages  and  disadvantages
of using  controls  in  heterodox  programs. We conclude  in section  V  with
general  lessons  anl  policy  implicatioi.
II.  The  Heterodox  Programs
The existing  literature  is  not precise  in  defining  heterodox  programs.
In Bruno  et.  al. (1988),  for  example,  the sample  of  heterodox  experiments
includes  programs  as diverse  as the  Austral,  Cruzado  and  that  of Israel,
while  Ocampo  (1987)  includes  the  Peruvian  populLst  experiment  of 1985 in  a
study  of  heterodox  programs  (figure  1 summarizes  recent  inflation  in these
countries).
In this  paper  we consider  a& heterodox  programs  those  that  use income-
policies  in the first  stage  but  which  are  part of a long  term stabilization
effort  in  which the  fiscal  balance  is maintained  persistently. In this
respect  we take a different  stand  from  pzevious  works.  The  distinctive
feature  of these  programs  is the  initial  a  temporary  use  of price  and  wage
controls  and  a fixed  exchange  rate  to achieve  3  rapid  reduction  in inflation.
Once  controls  are  removed  it  usually  becomes  an exchange  rate  based
orthodox  program. Since  most orthodox  exchange  rate  based  stabilization
programs  are  usually  preceded  by a  money  based  stabilization  stage  (e.g.
Chile  and  Argentina  in the  mid-seventies),  the  main difference  between
orthodox  and  heterodox  is the  strategy  for  stopping  inflation  in the  first
stage. Inflation  comes  down  slowly  in the former  and  rapidly  in the  latter.
Few  programs  satisfy  our  definition  of heterodox. There  are  just two6
examples  in  the  eighties  of heterodox  programst  the  Israeli  program  of 1985
and  the  Mexican  program  of 1987-88.4 Yoth  programs  used Income  policies
initially  to achieve  a rapid  reduction  in inflation,  in  both cases  the
exchange  rate  was the  main  nominal  anchor  and  was fixed  at the  beginning,  and
both  maintained  the  fiscal  adjustment  throughout.8  There  were differences
in the  deg-ee  with which  controls  were applied  in the  two  countries. In
Israel  for  example,  controls  were economy  wide,  while in  Mexico  the
government  opted  to allow  a large  number  of prices  to be freely  determined.
But these  differences  were  only of degree  and  not of substance,  the
philosophy  behind  these  two  programs  was basically  the  same.
Brazil  implemented  an important  and  quite  successful  income  policies
based  stabilization  program  in the  mid-sixties. As in the  eighties,  the
stabilization  program  paid  due  attention  to the fiscal  accounts. It  'vr
different  from  the  heterodox  shocks  of the  eighties  because  controls  were
introduced  in  a graduai  form,  to a large  extent  on a voluntary  basis,  and
because  it did  not  bring  about  the spectacular  reductions  in inflation
observed  in the  eighties. 8
In addition  to the  heterodox  programs  mentioned  above,  there  are  a
number  of programs  that started  as heterodox  and  addressed  the  budget  deficit
at the  beginning,  but  where the  fiscal  stance  was relaxed  later  on and
4  The  Mexican  program  cannot  be fully  evaluated  yet, since  two and  a
half years  is  not a long  enough  period  according  to our  criteria. Progress
has been  good,  however,  and  the  prospects  are  nromising.
a  The Israeli  program  is  analyzed  in detail  in  Bruno  and  Pitterman
(1988),  Bruno  and  Meridor (1990),  and  Liviatan  (1088)  and (1990)  among  others,
and the  Mexican  program  in  Ortiz (1990). See  also  Kiguel  and  Liviatan  (1989).
a  This  program  is  discussed  in  more detail  io Simonsen  (1974),  and
Cardoso  and  Fishlow  (1989)  among  others.7
whifted  into  a different  path.  These  programs  are  included  in  our study
because  they illustrate  the  similarities  in  overall  macro-developments  during
the  early  stage  between  those  programs  that  persist  and  those  that  do not.
Within  the  latter  (which  we call  not-persistent  heterodox)  we include  the
1985  Austral  plan in  Argentina,  and two  programs  of che  sixties,  the
Argentine  1967  program  under  Krieger  Vasena  and  the  Uruguay  program  of 1968.
Finally,  we include  two  popultste  programs. 7 These  so called
stabilization  programs  used  price-wage  controls  and  a fixed  exchange  rate to
stop  inflation  but  paid  no attention  whatsoever  to the fiscal  side.  In fact,
many of these  programs  combined  controls  with expansionary  fiscal  and
monetary  policies,  and  increases  in real  wages  with disastrous  macroeconomic
implications.  The inclusion  of these  programs  is useful  because  their
evolution  is very  different  from  the  not-persistent  heterodox. Recent
examples  of populist  programs  are  the  Cruzado  plan in Brazil  and  the  Peruvian
program  of 1985.
1II.  Problems  with the  Orthodox  Approach
The adoption  of the  heterodox  approach  was most times  motivated  by the
difficulties  encountered  in chronic  inflation  countries  with the  orthodox
approach. These  difficri.ties  are  well documented  in Kiguel  and  Liviatan
(1988)  which discusses  different  types  of orthodox  stabilization  programs  in
which the  fiscal  adjustment  was undertaken. The slow  and  many times  small
reductions  in inflation  are common  to programs  that  used  money and  to those
7.  See  Dornbusch  and  Edwards  (1989)  for  a  more extensive  discussion  on
these  programs.8
that  used  the  exchange  rate  as  the  main  nominal  anchor.  In  few  cases,  one
even  observes  the  paradoxical  result  of  inflation  increasing  permanently  in
conjunction  with  a  reduction  in  the  budget  deficit.
The  Mexican  Ex*erience
The Moeicani experience  prior  to  the  Pacto  is  a  good  example  of  the
frustration  with  orthodox  programs  characteristic  of  countries  that
eventually  opt  for  the  heterndox  strategy.  Table  1  sumnarizes  the  main
macroeconomic  developments  in  MexLio  in  the  eighti8es.  The  fiscal  accounts
were  corrected  early  on  in  an  impressive  way,  t%e deficit  in  the  operational
balance  (which  was  11  percent  of  GDP  in  1981)  was  basiLAlly  eliminated  by
1983.'  But  this  draotic  reduction  in  the  deficit  was  accompanied  by  large
devaluations  which  induced  an  increase  in  inflation  from  28  percent  in  1981
to  100  percent  in  1983. In  an  attempt  to  reduce  inflation,  the  policy
shifted  in  1984  to  using  the  exchange  rate  as  the  nominal  anchor,  but  this
strategy  had  only  moderate  and  temporary  effects  in  reducing  inflation
(although  the  fiscal  accounts  continued  to  be  sound).  In  fact,  inflation
went  up  in  1986  once  again,  wher.  the  exchange  rate  rule  was  abandoned  and
substituted  for  a  policy  of  aggressive  devaluations  to  deal  with  the  plunOge
in  oil  prices.  The  acceleration  of  inflation  continued  In  1987,  a  year  in
which  the  government  ran  a  surplus  in  its  operational  balance.
The  Mexican  experience  makes  clear  that  a  correction  in  the  budget
deficit  is  not  sufficient  for  bringing  down  inflation.  A budget  surplus
8  The  significant  improvement  in  the  primary  balance  is  another
indication  of  the  sizeatle  improvement  in  the  fiscal  accounts.  While  public
sector  borrowing  requirements  (PSBR)  increased  during  the  period,  this  is  not
an  indication  of  loose  fiscal  policy.  Because  the  PSBR  includes  nominal
interest  payments  which  increase  with  inflation,  the  size  of  the  PSBR  is  more
a reflection  of  inflation  rather  than  a  cause.9
might  not be enough  for  this  purpose. This  means that  a  well designed
atabilization  program  needs  to balance  the  correction  in the  fundamentals
with a policy  to  manage  the  nominal  anchors. In  Mexico,  however,  the  success
was meager  even  when the  exchange  rate  was used  as nominal  anchor,  especially
because  the iominal  anchor  proved  weak when th,  economy  faced  an adverse
external  shock.
The  difficulties  in controlling  inflation  through  various  orthoe
strategies  In  the  aftermath  of the  debt crisis  is  perhaps  the  main reasnr.  why
Mexico  finally  decided  to go for  the  heterodox  approach. The  available
information  indicates  that  the  Mexicans  adopted  this  approach  reluctantly,
and  that  many of the  concerns  on the  use of controls  that  critics  of these
programs  raise  were shared  by policy  makers  in  Mexicoi.  Nevertheless,
reluctantly,  but encouraged  by the success  of the  Israeli  program,  the
Mexican  authorities  finally  accepted  to try  the  heterodox  alternative.
Reasons  for  Inflationary  Rigidities
The  difficulties  experienced  in  Mexico  for  bringing  down  inflation  are
characteristic  of  chronic  inflation  countries.  The  reasons  for  the  existence
of  inflationary  rigidities  have been  widely  discussed  in the literature. 9
For  the  purpoje  of  our  discussion  it is  useful  to  differmntiate  two  types  of
rigidities:  A first  type,  that  we will call institutional,  results  from  the
existence  of backward  indexation,  staggered  contracts,  etc.  This is the  type
discussed  for  example  in  Fischer  (1977)  and (1983),  Taylor  (1979),  Lopez  and
Bacha (1983),  etc.
A second  type  of rigidity,  that  we will call  expectational,  arises  from
9  See  for  example  Dornbusch  and  Simonsen  (1987),  Tobin  (1987)  Ch. 29,
Btc.10
lack  of credibility  about  the  ability  of the government  to bring  down
inflation  on a  long  term  basis.  The  credibility  problem  could  arise  from  the
perception  that  the  government  will  not adjust  and  malntain  the  fiscal
balarce  as required  to support  low  inflation  (i.e.  because  of temporariness
or past  failures). A  second,  less  understood  credibility  problem  arises
because  there  could  be a suspicion  that  the  government  would  deviate  from the
announced  targets  for  the  nominal  anchor  (i.e.  the  exchange  rate  or  monetary
rule)  if confronted  with increases  in  wages  and  prices  in excess  of the
targets. Credibility  on the  nominal  side  is different  from  credibility  on
the  fiscal  side,  and  it arises  because  the  government  has  non-fiscal
objectives  (such  as  maintaining  full  employment  or external  balance)  which in
a discretionary  regime  could  lead  it to  accept  increases  in inflation  to
avoid  higher  real  wages  or stepping  up the  rate  of devaluation  to avoid
overvaluation  of the  domestic  currency.' 0
IV. Income  Policies  in Heterodox  Programs
Income  policies  are  included  in heterodox  programs  to overcome  the
rigidities  in inflation  discussed  above. The  potential  usefulness  of income
policies  largely  depends  on the  causes  of the  inflationary  rigidities.
Besides,  they are  not  necessarily  the  most effective  instrument  to deal  with
this  problem,  because  the long  term  costs  of their  inclusion  in  programs  (as
we will show later  in this  section)  could  well exceed  the short  term  benefits
reaped  from  overcoming  the  rigidities  early  on.
I0  The  use of inflation  to achieve  non-fiscal  objectives  is  analyzed  in
detail  in  the  policy  games  literature  such  as Barro  and  Gordon  (1983)  and
others.11
Incme  Policies  to deal  with Institutional  Inflationary  Rigidities
In situations  in  which  backward  indexation  is the  main source  of
rigidity  (the  argument  usually  used  to describe  the  inflation  process  in
Brazil),  an initial  realignment  of prices  and  wales  accompanied  by the
elimination  of indexation  in  the  economy  is all  that is  needed. A three  or
four  months  freeze  of prices  and  wages is certainly  not required  to break
this  cycle. Once the right  relative  prices  are  in place  and indexation  is
eliminated  the  problem  of backward  indexation  in principle  disappears.
A major  difficulty  in this  respect  is to determine  the 'ri:ht"  set  of
relative  prices. The  difficulty  is greater  in low inflation  economies,  where
nominal  contracts  are long  and  staggered,  than  in high inflation  economies,
where  contracts  are short  and  highly  synchronized.  Although  there  are
examples  of  programs  in low  inflation  economies  (such  as the  Krieger  Vasena
program  in the sixties  in  Argentina)  that  used fairly  sophisticated  rules  to
avoid  disparities  in real  wages  across  sectors,  it is questionable  whether
the  complications  and  misjudgments  are  worth  the gains. The role  of income
policies  in low  inflation  economies  is very limited,  and  hence  the  case for
their  use is  weak.
A  stronger  case  for  income  policies,  as a way to deal  with
institutional  inertia,  can  be  made in  high inflation  economies,  where  prices
and  wage decisions  are  synchronized.  This  higher  synchronization  reduces  the
risks  that  a freeze  would  create  large  disparities  in relative  prices  and
wages. A legitimate  question  is  whether  an orthodox  shock,  as an
alternative,  is a  better  way to stop  high inflation  in  chronic  inflation
countries,  especially  because  the  orthodox  approach  has  proved  effective  in
stopping  hyperinflation.  However,  as discussed  in Kiguel  and  Liviatan12
(1988),  this  approach  will  not  work  in  the  same  way  because  an  orthodox
stabilization  program  is  usually  less  credible  to  deal  with  chronic  high
inflation  than  with  hyperinflation.
While  getting  relative  prices  right  in  high  inflation  economies  is
easier  than  in  low  inflation  economies,  and  in  this  sense  income  policies
provide  an  opportunity  to  address  institutional  inertia,  a  short  freeze  is
not  likely  to  be  enough  to  stop  inflation.  Expectations  play  a  major  role  in
determining  inflation.  The  price-wage  setting  mechanism  involves  predictions
about  what  will  happen  to  inflation  in  the  future,  which  can  not  be  based
simply  on  past  inflation.  In  forming  inflation  expectations  agents  look  at
the  inflation  history  of  the  country,  as  well  as  specific  aspects  such  as  the
record  of  the  numerous  previous  stabilization  attempts  (which  is  usually
dismal),  the  way  in  which  inflation  was  affected  by  external  shocks,  etc.
Income  Policies  to  Deal  with  Expectational  Inflationary  Riaidities
I.  Fiscal  Aspects
Income  policies  are  potentially  more  useful  to  deal  with  some  of  the
expectational  aspects  of  the  inflation  process.  Specifically,  incorrect
expectations  resulting  from  lack  of  credibility  on  the  fiscal  adjustment
could  cause  persistence  in  inflation  leading  to  overvaluation,  current
account  deficits  and  other  difficulties.  Controls  could  thus  be  useful  in
situations  where  the  government  announces  and  makes  the  fiscal  adjustment,
but  private  agents  do  not  fully  believe  it  and  set  prices  on  this  assumption.
The  purpose  of  controls  in  these  circumstances  is  to  address  the  costs  that
would  arise  from  the  difficulties  created  by  adverse  expectations. 11 Since
it  takes  time  to  demonstrate  the  commitment  on  the  fiscal  side,  the  period  of
11 This  type  of  argument  is  made  in  Persson  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1989).13
controls  needs  to be longer  than  to deal  with institutional  rigidities.
Ideally,  by the  time  controls  are  removed  there  should  be a clearer  picture
on  how far  the  government  is  willing  to adjust  on the  fiscal  side.
In the  more successful  programs  the  overall  fiscal  situation  improved
during  the  period  of price  controls. In the  Israeli  program  the  fiscal
deficit  turned  into  a surplus. A key  decision,  which signified  the  new
regime,  was the abandonment  of a large,  sacred  aviation  project,  the  Lavy,  a
measure  that few  expected  could  be undertaken. The  experience  in  Mexico  is
somewhat  different  because  to a large  extent  the  fiscal  adjustment  had  been
completed  prior  to the  program. Nevertheless,  the  government  introduced
additional  tax  measures  and  continued  its  efforts  to redimension  the  public
sector  through  privatizations  of public  sector  enterprises. Likewise,  in the
successful  Brazilian  program  of the  sixties  the fiscal  accounts  improved
during  the  period  of controls
This  period  was not  used effectively  in  the  not-persistent  programs.
In the  Austral  plan,  for  example,  the  fiscal  and  quasi-fiscal  accounts
deteriorated  slowly,  but steadily,  during  the  period  of the freeze  (see
figure  2).  Although  the size  of the  fiscal  deficit  remained  well below  the
levels  prior  to the  Austral  plan,  the  lack  of determination  to address  the
budget  deficit  in  a permanent  way  perhaps  signalled  that  the  authorities  were
not ready  to fight  inflation  persistently. The fiscal  accounts  also
deteriorated  during  the  freeze  in the  programs  of the  sixties  in  Argentina
and  Uruguay.
ii.  Nominal  Aspects
While following sound fiscal policies  in the initial period is
essential  to build  credibility  on the  fiscal  side,  and in this respect  it14
helps  to support  stabilization  in the  longer  run, these  actions  do not
directly  help to establish  credibility  on the  nominal  side.  Because  it is
easy  to maintain  the  nominal  anchors  for  a short  time  when prices  are frozen,
the  private  sector  cannot  learn  how  determined  the  government  is to defend
its  nominal  anchors  if faced  with adverse  expectations  once  prices  are freely
determined. This  difficulty  is thus  postponed  by controls,  since  it is  only
when prices  and  wages  are flexibilized  that the  government  can demonstrate
its  commitment  to defend  the  nominal  anchors.
The  key question  regarding  credibility  on the  nominal  side  is  whether
the government  will maintain  its rules  for  the  nominal  anchors  if faced  with
persistent  inflation  due  to adverse  expectations. Increases  in prices  and
wages  do not  necessarily  take  place  because  private  agents  expect  that the
initial  improvement  in the  fiscal  accounts  would  be reversed. They  could
instead  reflect  the  concern  of  workers  and  firms,  who set  nominal  prices  in
advance  for  fixed  periods,  that  these  prices  would  be eroded  through  an
unexpected  devaluation  in  order  to increase  employment  or improve  the  balance
of payments. The  concern  is many  times  justified  because  this  was exactly
the strategy  used in the  past  to deal  with  adverse  external  shocks  (as  for
example  in  Brazil  and  Hexico  in  1982-84).
The  perception  that  the  government  could  deviate  from  the  announced
target  for  the  nominal  exchange  rate  was  perhaps  most clear  during  the  Pacto
in  Mexico. The  policy  adopted  there  was  to announce  the  values  of future
exchange  rates  for  a period  of around  six  months. Once the  period  was about
to expire  a new rule  was announced  for  the  next  half year.  Nominal  interest
rates,  however,  have  remained  very  high,  certainly  above  international  levels
(in  an ex-post  basis). The  excess  of domestic  interest  rates  over15
international  intersst  rates  to a large  extent  reflected  the risk  that  the
government  would deviate  from  the  announced  exchange  rate  policy,  Host
likely,  this  risk  was not directly  related  to a fiscal  problem (since  the
operational  budget  deficit  remained  small,  and  the surplus  in the  primary
fiscal  balance  was sustained),  instead,  it reflected  concern  about  whether
the  exchange  rule  rate  could  be  maintained  in  view of a persistent
deterioration  in the  current  account  of the  balance  of payments  (see  table
1).1 The  problem  is generally  exacerbated  because  it is  difficult  to know
ex-ante  when  and  how  much the  government  is  willing  to compromise  in order  to
reduce  the  costs  of disinflation.
Not  only are income  policies  ineffective  to deal  with the  credibility
problem  on the  nominal  side,  but they  could  weaken  the  chances  of  maintaining
the  rules  for  the  nominal  anchors  once  prices  and  wages are  liberalized. The
use  of controls  early  on could  be read  by the  private  sector  as a  signal  that
the  government  is  not  willing  to stick  to the rules  for  the  nominal  anchors
(e.g.  adhere  to the  exchange  rate  rule)  if confronted  with adverse
expectations.  This  type  of credibility  problem  is  not solved  with income
policies;  it requires  that  the  government  demonstrates  its  willingness  to
absorb  the  costs  associated  with defending  the  nominal  anchors  (i.e.
overvaluation,  recession,  etc.).
IV.  Experience  With the  Heterodox  Approach
i.  Difficulties  in Identifying  Persistent  Programs  in  the First  Stage
1  This  deterioration  in the  current  account  is in fact  characteristic
of exchange  rate  stabilizations  (the  reasons  for  this  phenomenon  are  discussed
at length  in Kiguel  and  Liviatan  (1990.C)16
A common  feature  in the  programs  considered  above  is that  in  all  cases,
regardless  of  whether  or  not  they  do  anything  on  the  fiscal  side,  inflation
comes  to a  halt almost  immediately. Figure  1 illustrates  that  this
phenomenon  is  observed  in  serious  programs  (such  as  Israel  and  Mexico),  note
persistent  progrems  (the  Austral,  Krieger  Vasena  and  Uruguay  1968)  and  in
populist  programs  (the  Cruzado  plan,  and  Peru  1985).
These  experiences  indicate  that  the  initial  impact  on  inflation  does
not  convey  useful  information  about  the  sustainability  of  the  stabilization
effort.  It  is  thus  necessary  to  look  at  the  behavior  of  other  macroeconomic
variables  to  assess  whether  or  not  the  stabilization  program  is  evolving  in
the  right  direction.  Populist  programs  are  in  most  cases  easy  to  recognize
because  they  tend  to  follow  the  common  pattern  detailed  in  Dornbusch  and
Edwards (1989). The  distinction  is  more difficult  between  persistent  and
not-persistent  programs.  This  is  apparent  from  Blejer  and  Liviatan  (1987),
which  compares  the  outcomes  during  the  first  year  of  the  stabilization
programs  in  Argentina  and  Israel  of  1985. Within  that  time  frame  they
conclude  that  "the  programs  were  similar  in  their  designs  and  their  effects'
(p.409).  The  similarities  were  specially  strong  during  the  first  three
quarters  of the  two  programs.'a  Likewise,  both the  Krieger  Vasena  program
in  Argentina  and  the  Uruguay  program  of  1968,  which  were  eventually
abandoned,  started  in  a  very  promising  way  and  remained  sound  for  a
relatively  long  time  (around  two  years),  Both  seemed  to  have  a reasonable
'"  The  similarities  included  policy  variables  such  as  the  budget  deficit
and  the  nominal  exchange  rate  and  endogenous  variables  such  as  real  money
balances,  interest  rates,  real  wages,  the  real  exchange  rate,  the  premium  for
the  black  market  exchange  rate,  unemployment,  industrial  production,  the  trade
balance,  etc.17
chance  of  success  initially,  and  the  outcomes  were  very  similar  to  the  more
successful  Brazilian  program  of  the  sixties.  While  the  differences  between
persistent  and  not-persistent  programs  becomes  clearer  over  time,  it  is  not
always  easy  to  distinguish  them  in  the  early  stages.
It  is difficult to explain why governments  start  programs that are
later  abandoned,  especially  because  the  costs  of  failure  are  non-negligible.
One  possible  reason  is  that  policy  makers  underestimate  the  costs  of
disinflation,  and  once  they  realized  that  the  costs  are  larger  than  they  had
expected  the  programs  are  abandoned.  Another  explanation  is  that  there  is
widespread  political  support  for  stabilization  when  inflation  is  high,  but
this  support  evaporates  once  specific  groups  are  being  hurt  by  the  policies
introduced  to  maintain  price  stability  (e.g.  budget  cuts).
This  difficulty  in  distinguishing  persistent  from  not-persistent
programs  introduces  additional  costs  for  the  former.  In  particular,  since
agents  can  not  tell  what  type  of  program  it  is,  they  will  always  attach  some
(non-negligible)  probability  to  its  possible  failure.  Both,  persistent  and
not-persistent  programs  are  thus  likely  to  face  credibility  problems  which
will  be  reflected  in  high  interest  rates  or  overvaluation  of  the  domestic
currency  (as  discussed  in  the  previous  section).  Both  Israel  and  Hexico  have
faced  a  real  appreciation  during  the  stabilization  process.  In  addition,
both  countries  have  also  faced  high  real  (ex-post)  interest  rates  for  a
protracted  period.
ii. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Heterodox Approach
The  above  discussion  indicates  that  the  heterodox  approach  is  not
necessarily  superior  to  other  approaches.  In  section  III  we  discussed  some
the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  controls  to  deal  with  inflationary  rigidities18
resulting  from institutional  and  expectational  factors. We also discussed
that  one  potential  advantage  of the  heterodox  over the  money  base orthodox
strategy  is  that the initial  costs  of r.  .ucing  inflation  are low.  In  what
follows  we will discuss  in  more detail  other  advantages  and  disadvantages  of
the  heterodox  approach  in chronic  inflation  countries,  with special  attention
on the long  term implications.
Advantages
Small  Costs  of Bringing  Down Inflation
As we r,oted  earlier,  one  characteristic  of  heterodox  programs  is that
the initial  costs  of bringing  down  inflation  are  small.  The typical  pattern
in these  cases  ir  an initial  short  recession,  followed  by a temporary
expansion,  followed  in turn  by a deeper  recession,  a pattern  that  is common
to exchange rate based stabilizations in chronic inflation countries."
4 The
expansion  in this type  of  programs  is  caused  by adverse  expectations  on the
ability  of the  government  to  maintain  the  exchange  rate rule.  The  perception
that the program is temporary leads to an increase in expenditure and output,
an appreciation  of the  real  exchange  rate,  and  a deterioration  in the  current
account. As  the  programs  persists,  demand  recedes  while  the real
appreciation  impacts  negatively  on output and the  economy  enters  the
recessionary  period.
This  cycle is observed most clearly in Israel where the sequence
started  with a brief  recession,  that  lasted  approximately  six  months,  there
was an expansionary  period  in 1986  and  1987,  which  was in turn  followed  by a
recession  starting  in the  second  half  of 1987.  Likewise,  at least  initially,
14  A fuller  discussion  of the  reasons  leading  to this  cycle  is  presented
in Kiguel  and  Liviatan  (1990.a). Here  we only  outline  the  main arguments.19
the  reduction  in inflation  in  Mexico  has  not been  associated  with a
recession,  just the  opposite,  the  economy  has been  growing  faster  than  in the
years  preceding  the  Pacto. Although  Mexico  has not  yet experienced  a
recessionary  phase,  this  can  not  be ruled  out  for  the  near future. The
initial  costs  of bringing  down inflation  were also  small  in the  not-
persistent  programs,  which  also started  with an improvement  in the fiscal
balance  and  high interest  rates  (e.g.  Austral  plan,  Krieger  Vasena  program,
etc.)."'
The reL_cively  small  initial  costs  of bringing  down inflation  in
heterodox  programs  stands  in contrast  with those  of  money  based  orthodox
stabilization  programs  (i.e.  programs  that rely  on tight  money for  stopp;ng
inflation). The  Chilean  program  of the  mid-seventies  is one example  of a
money  based  stabilization.' 6 The  costs  in that  program  came  early  on in the
form  of a deep recession  and  massive  unemployment.
In  heterodox  stabilization  programs  the  costs  of stopping  inflation
usually  appear  later  on.  The first  stage,  while  tight  controls  are in place,
is  the  easy  part.  This is the  period  in  which  inflation  falls  with little  or
even  no costs  in terms  of unemployment. The  problems  start  later  on,  when
controls  are relaxed,  and  the  appreciation  of the  domest5c  currency  leads  to
a recession,  a loss  of  competitiveness  that  hurts  the  export  sector,  and  to
X5  The  populist  programs  are  clearly  different  in this  respect. They
start  with a  very expansionary  phase  in  which  output  is driven  by increases  in
aggregate  demand  resulting  mainly  from  expansionary  monetary  and  fiscal
policies. This  brisk  expansionary  phase  in  populist  programs  stands  in
contrast  to the  initial  recession  observed  in  most persistent  and  not-
persistent  heterodox.
'6  For a description  of this  program  see for  example  Edwards  and  Edwards
(1987)  and  Corbo  and  Solimano  (1990).20
high interest  rates  that  are  necessary  to maintain  attractive  rates  of return
on domestic  assets  (on  an ex-ante  basis)  to avoid  capital  flight.
The difficulties  for  disinflation  arise  later  on because  the
overvaluation  that  took  place  during  the  expansionary  period  needs  to be
corrected  without  losing  control  of the  main nominal  anchor:  the  exchange
rate.  While  a large  devaluation  could  restore  competitiveness,  the  trade-
off  of this  scheme  is  the loss  of confidence  about  the  government's
willingness  to sustain  the  stabilization  program. A large  devaluation  could
be read  as a an indication  that  the  government  is  not  willing  to  pay the
costs  resulting  from  overvaluation  and  instead  is ready  to accept  a rekindle
of inflation.
The  two  successful  heterodox  programs  of the  eighties  have  experienced
a period  of overvaluation. Both  Israel  and  Mexico  have continued  to use  the
exchange  rate  as the  nominal  anchor,  but  neither  of them  has  been able  to
overcome  this  difficulty  yet despite  the  adoption  of different  strategies.
Israel  opted  for  unannounced  step  devaluations  (mostly  in the  order  of 10
percent)  to avoid  further  appreciation,  while  Mexico  opted  for  a preannounced
crawling  peg (of  the  type  used in the  Southern  Cone in the late  seventies).
Gains  from  the  Olivera-Tanzi  Effect  in Reversed
One  advantage  of the  heterodox  approach  is  that the  rapid  reduction  in
inflation  early  on can  have favorable  effects  on various  aspects  of the
program. On the fiscal  side,  there  are  gains  derived  from  the  Olivera-Tanzi
effect  working  on reverse. This  consideration  is more important  in  countries
where  inflation  is  high,  such  as those  that  adopted  the  heterodox  shocks  in
the  eighties. The size  of these  gains  are difficult  to  measure,  in Israel  it
was estimated  to be around  1.5  percent  of GDP,  while  in the  Austral  plan it21
amounted  to around  2  percent  of GDP.  There  were additional  gains,  especially
in the  Austral  plan,  from raising  public  enterprise  prices  at the  outset  to
levels  that  greatly  improved  the  finances  of these  firms.
These  gains,  while  potentially  important,  should  be treated  with
caution  because  they  are  not  a "true"  signal  of the  fiscal  effort. A program
that  bases  most of the  fiscal  improvement  simply  on the gains  from  this
effect  is likely  to fail,  since  the  lower  deficit  will remain  in place  onlv
if the  government  succeeds  in  keeping  inflation  low. Any shock  that
destabilizes  inflation  will increase  the  deficit  making  the  inflation  prucess
self-sustained.  In addition,  to the  extent  that  public  sector  enterprise
prices  are  not adjusted  during  the  period  of controls,  there  is a8so  a
deterioration  in their  finances. This  means  that  the  gains  from  the reversed
Olivera-Tanzi  effect  should  be a relatively  small  part  of the  fiscal
adjustment. In Israel,  for  example,  it is  estimated  that  this represented  a
quarter  of the  improvement  in the  fiscal  accounts;  while  in Mexico  it  was not
very important. In the  Austral  plan,  on the  other  hand,  a large  part of the
improvement  in the fiscal  accounts  resulted  from  the  reversed  Olivera-Tanzi
effect  in conjunction  with the  increase  in public  sector  enterprise  prices.
Credibility  on the  Fiscal  Side
There  are two  reasons  why the  initial  fall  in inflation  can  help in
establishing  credibility  on the  fiscal  side.  First,  as  we mentioned  in
section  III,  the government  can  use  the freeze  to prevent  a persistence  in
domestic  inflation  (due  to lack  of credibility)  that  would lead  to
distortions  in relative  prices,  while it  performs  the  fiscal  adjustment.
Second,  low  inflation  makes  it easier  in practice  to calculate  the  size  of
the  budget  deficit  and in this  sense  it  can  make this  process  more22
transparent."'  It is difficult  under  high inflation  to know the  size  of the
budget  deficit. For  example,  there  is  more room  under  high inflation  for
using  accounting  tricks  to  mask the  true state  of the fiscal  accounts.
Sharon  (1990)  argues  that  in Israel  the reduction  in inflation  was
instrumental  to keep track  of the  evolution  of the  fiscal  accoints. In
addition,  there  are difficulties  in  calculating  real interest  rates,  since
they  depend  on the  choice  of the  deflator  (i.e.  it could  be actual  (ex-post)
or the  expected  (ex-ante)  rate  of inflation).
Add  Momentum  to Stabilization
A fourth  possible  advantage  of the  heterodox  approach  is that  the
Anitial  fall  in inflation  might  add  momentum  to introduce  additional  measures
to strengthen  the  program. Cuts in  government  expenditures  or increases  in
taxes  that  are difficult  to accept  while inflation  remains  high could  be
better  received  if undertaken  to support  a low  rate of inflation  that  is
already  there. In  the  Austral  plan,  for  example,  the  Alfonsin  government
received  widespread  support  during  the  first  months  of the.program,  enough  to
implement  additional  measures  to  make the initial  fiscal  adjustment  more
robust. This  opportunity  was lost,  however,  perhaps  because  it  was thought
at the  time that  the  initial  fall  in inflation  could  be maintained  without
any further  actions.
The  experience  of the  Austral  plan  indicates  that  the  quick  reduction
in inflation  could  in fact  work either  way.  It could  help the  adjustment  if
the  government  is determined  to undertake  it,  but it  could  also  postpone
adjustment  if the  early,  transitory  success  is taken  as evidence  that
stabilization  is there  to stay.
17  This  point  is  discussed  at length  in Tanzi (1989).23
Disadvantages  of  Using  Controls
Common  Criticisms
A first  disadvantage  is  that  controls  that  they  could  lead  to  disregard
the improvement in the fiscal  accounts;  controls  could become a substitute
for  the  fiscal  adjustment.  The  good  initial  results  on  inflation  and  the
small  costs  in  terms  of unemployment  create  a  tendency  for  complacency  on the
fiscal  side  that  potentially  undermines  the  success  of  the  program.  Populist
programs  are  an  extreme  case,  as  they  try  to  gain  price  stability  without
fiscal  adjustment.  This  was  the  case  in  the  Cruzado  plan  and  the  Peruvian
program  where  the  combination  of  controls  and  a  policy  of  excess  demands
rapidly  led  to  repressed  inflation,  widespread  shortages,  and  to  the
emergence  of  black  markets.  In  the  end,  of  course,  there  was  an  explosion  in
prices. In  Peru  this  led  to  hyperinflation,  while  in  Brazil  to  an  outburst
in  inflation  that  was  stopped  through  a  new  round  of  controls.
Overadjustment  on  the  fiscal  side  is  helpful  in  signalling  the
intentions  of  the  government.'@  Because  populist  programs  abuse  controls,
heterodox  programs  need  to  do  more  on  the  fiscal  side  to  show  that  they  are
indeed  different  from  the  former.  In  addition,  the  a  fiscal  overadjustment
is  required  to  support  a  situation  of  overall  excess  supplies  which  is
critical  in  these  programs  to  avoid  shortages  during  the  period  of  controls.
In  practice,  the  difference  between  heterodox  and  populist  programs  became
apparent  shortly  after  the  programs  were  launched.  Key  differences  were  the
attitude  towardr  real  wages  and  to  the  importance  of  fiscal  (and  sometimes
monetary)  policy,  and  the  fact  that  generalized  shortages  did  not  emerge  in
's  Rodrik  (1989)  also  makes  a case  for  overadjustment  of  policies  when
looking  at  sustainability  of  trade  policy.24
heterodox  program3. The  distinction  was not apparent  in this  respect,
however,  between  persistent  and  not-persistent  programs,  because  shortages
did  not arise  in either  of them,  while the  evolution  of real  wages  was
similar.
Another  criticism  on the  use  of controls  is that  they lead  to
misallocation  of  resources.  In  our  view  this is a less important issue.
While  this  criticism  is  valid  for  countries  that  use controls  on a long term
basis,  it is  much weaker  for  heterodox  programs  where  controls  are  used  only
temporarily. In addition,  in  most heterodox  programs  (even  in the  not-
persistent  ones)  controls  were  not used in  a rigorous  manner,  as  firms  were
granted  exceptions  to  raise  prices  whenever  it  was  clear  that  their  prices
were out  of line.
A  third,  more relevant,  criticism  of controls  is that  once  implemented
they are  difficult  to remove. While  this  criticism  is  valid  for  heterodox
programs, it is in fact more  general  as  it  also applies to programs that
announce  rules  for  nominal  variables (especially the exchange rate).  It is
typical  of exchange  rate  based  stabilizations  to fix  the exchange  rate  for  a
longer  period  that  was initially  intended. This  difficulty  arises  because  a
departure  from  the  original  rule  could  be interpretated  as a signal  that  the
government  is abandoning  its  nominal  policies. The  outcome  is a period  of
overvaluation  with  is well known costs.  In programs that start with price
controls  the  two  problems  go together. The  Uruguay  program  of 1968  provides
useful  insights  in this  respect.' 9 The  program  started  as other  heterodox
programs,  with a reduction  in the  budget  deficit,  a  fixed  exchange  rate  and
'9  For  a detailed  discussion  of this  program  see  Finch  (1979)  or Viana
(1988).25
price  and  wage  controls.  The fiscal  and  external  situatione  deteriorated
over  the  years,  and  after  some time  it  was  clear  that  adjustments  were  needed
in the  program.  These  adjustments  were  postponed  at  that  time  mainly  because
elections  were  coming  up  and  the  authorities  were  reluctant  to  free  prices
and  wages  and  devalue  the  exchange  rate.  Eventually,  as  one  would  have
expected,  the  program  collapsed  with  mazi-devaluations  and  record  high  levels
of  inflation.  The  lesson  here  is  that  even  programs  that  appear  to  be
heterodox  early  on  could  deviate  from  their  original  intent.
Difficulties  in  Assessing  rogress
It  is  always  hard  to  determine  at  the  outset  whether  a  stabilization
program will  succeed.  This  is  true  for  both  orthodox  and  heterodox  programs.
In  Bolivia,  for  example,  the  August  1985  successful  orthodox  stabilization
program  that  brought  hyperinflation  to  a  halt  was  preceded  by  other
stabilization  efforts  which  were  not  distinctively  different.  And  even  this
successful  program  confronted  a serious  reversal  towards  the  end  of  the  year
when hyperinflation  reemerged  for  a  brief  time.
This  difficulty  in  recognizing  successes  is  compounded in  heterodox
programs  by  the  fact  that  low  inflation  is  maintained  through  controls.  In
the  absence  of  market  determined  prices  it  is  more  difficult  to  evaluate
whether  the  program  is  working  because  the  fundamentals  are  in  order  and  low
inflation  is  there  to  stay,  or  because  controls  are  in  place.  The answer  to
this  question  must  wait  until  controls  are  removed  and  inflation  finds  its
new equilibrium.  In  the  meantime,  the  credibility  problem  is  bigger  in  a
heterodox  program.
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The Role of Controlss a Reassessment
The role  of controls  in  heterodox  programs  is  somewhat  of a puzzle.
Because  they  did  not lead  to shortages  or  marked  distortions  in  relative
prices,  this  could  be taken  as evidence  that  they  were not binding. If they
were not  binding,  then  why  were they  needed? It is  useful  in  this respect  to
point  out  that  in  chronic  inflation  countries  previous  programs  that  did  not
use  controls  always  failed  to  bring  about  a  sharp,  rapid  reduction  in
inflation.  The  fact  that  heterodox  programs  were able  to achieve  quick  and
drastic  reductions  in inflation  indicates  that  controls  were important  for
this  purpose.
In our view, the main role of controls in the initial stage in
heterodox  programs  was to coordinate  the  movement  to low  inflation.m To
understand  this argument  we can  think  of an economy  which initially  is in  a
high inflation  equilibrium,  at full  employment,  where  expectations  are  being
fulfilled,  and the  government  is  using  the  revenue  from  money  creation  to
finance  its  budget  deficit. The inflation  tax  literature  provides  a useful
analytical  framework  for  to  analyze  this  issue.  For  example,  in  Bruno
(1989),  and  Bruno  and  Fischer  (1990),  there  are  two  equilibria  consistent
with the same  budget  deficit. In  figure  3  we  provide  a  diagrammatical
presentation  the  core  of the  model.  The  mm schedule  shows  the  combination  of
real  money  balances  and  rates  of inflation  for  which the  money  market  clears.
The ss schedule,  shows  the  combinations  of real  money  balances  (m)  and rates
of inflation  (iX)  that  generate  the  necessary  amount  of inflation  tax to
finance  the  deficit. The  intersections  of these  schedules  show  the two
X  The role  of price-wage  controls  as a  coordinating  device  to  bring
down  inflation  is analyzed  in  more  detail  in Dornbusch  and  Simonsen  (1987).27
points  that  are  consistent  with the  money  demand  schedule  and the  need for
inflationary  finance  in the  long  run.
If the  economy  is initially  at the  high inflation  equilibrium  (point
A), controls  could  be used to  move the  economy  to the low  inflation
equilibrium  (point  B).  This  move does  not require  in  principle  any  change  in
the  budget  deficit. Controls  act  as a coordinating  mechanism,  the
announcement  that  controls  are in  place  could  be enough  to reverse
inflationary  expectations  thus allowing  the  economy  to remain  in the  low
inflation  equilibrium. Notice  that  in this  exercise  shortages  do not occur
as there  are  no excess  demand  pressures  and  the  economy  remains  at full
employment. The idea  that  controls  worked  in  heterodox  programs  because  they
*repressed"  inflation  (as  in  populist  programs)  is largely  misleading,  mainly
because  the  ability  to enforce  controls  was simply  not there. Controls  acted
as a shock  treatment,  as a guideline  for  a prompt  downward  revision  of
inflationary  expectations,  and  this  was at least  credible  in the short  run.
The  analytical  framework  discussed  above  provides  only  part  of the
story  because  it implicitly  assumes  that  once  the initial  difficulty  is
handled  (i.e.  moving  to the  lcw  inflation  equilibrium)  the  economy  will tend
to stay  there  (i.e.  it is stable). Bruno  argues  that the  low inflation
equilibrium  can  be made stable  if supported  by an appropriate  fiscal
adjustment. We know,  however,  there  is an additional  difficulty  in
sustaining  low inflation:  the  issue  of credibility  nominal  anchors. Thus the
initial  reduction  in inflation  is only  the  beginning,  as  persistence  is
needed  to sustain  stabilization.
When is  heterodox  apgropriate?
Given  the  advantages  and disadvantages  of heterodox  programs  their  use28
can only  be recommended  in  a limited  number  of cases.  On the  not recommended
list  we have first  the  non-chronic  inflation  countries  that suddenly
experienced  an inflationary  outburst. Examples  of this  are  Costa  Rica and
the  Philippines  in the  early  eighties. Both  countries  traditionally  had low
inflation,  but there  was a short  inflationary  spiral  following  the
devaluations undertook in response  to the debt crisis.  Income policies are
not a good idea  in these  cases  because  inflation  is  perceived  (correctly)  as
a temporary  phenomenon. The expectational  component  in the inflation  process
does  not  become  important,  and  hence  this  episode  can  be cured  with orthodox
measures. The  speed  with  which inflation  was brought  down  in Costa  Rica  and
the  Philippines  illustrates  that  this  was indeed  the  right  approach.
Hyperinflation  is a second  case  in  which the  orthodox  approach  is
preferred. The  arguments  for  using  orthodox  policies  in these  circumstances
are  discussed  in Kiguel  and  Liviatan  (1988). Finally,  the  orthoaoz  approach
is also  preferable  in low  and  moderate  inflation  economies. 21 The  main
reason  is that  controls  are  not likely  to generate  a large  reduction  in
inflation  is that  contracts  are typically  long  and staggered,  as opposed  to
high inflation  economies  where they  are  short  and  highly  synchronized.  A
freeze  would leave  great  disparities  in relative  wages  and  prices,  penalizing
those  with the  oldest  contracts. This  problem  is difficult  to  handle  in
practice,  because  it requires  a large  amount  of information.m
21  It is difficult  to the  determine  precisely  the rate  of inflation  for
this  nurpose. It lies  somewhere  between  20  percent  and  100  percent.
=  It is surprising  that  Tobin (1984)  does  not recognize  these
difficulties,  and  many of the  other  difficulties  analyzed  in this  paper  when
he makes  the  case for  income  policies. The idea  that  there  are  costless  ways
of bringing  down inflation  is  naive,  especially  because  it ignores  that  these
costs  are the price for building reputation.29
This  leaves  one  situation  in  which  the  heterodox  approach  is
potentially  useful.  Those  are  chronic  high  inflation  economies  such  as  those
that  opted  for  this  policy  in  the  eighties.  There  is  one  caveat,  however$
entering  a  heterodox  program  which  is later  on abandoned  is  potentially
dangerous.  The  costs  of  this  approach  could  be  larger  than  simply  postponing
stabilization.
Cost of  Failure
The  failures  of  the  Austral  and  Cruzado  plans  illustrates  these  risks.
In  both  cases  the  failures  were  followed  by  a  period  of  large  inflation
instability  which  ended  up  in  hyperinflation.'  (see  figure  4). These
similarities  were  not  accidental.  In  our  view,  the  inflation-stabilization
cycles  were  the  result  of  the  repeated  use  of  income  policies  as  a
stabilization  instrument  since  the  Austral  and  Cruzado  plans.  The  initial
prograws  set  the  stage  for  the  recurrent  use  of  income  policies,  as  they
showed  that  controls  can  be  extremely  effective  to  stop  in  inflation  in  the
short  run. However,  as  the  private  sector  understood  that  this  would  be  the
policy  followed  by  the  government,  it  started  to  inflate  price  increases  so
as  to  avoid  potential  negative  repercussions  on  profits  from  a  price  freeze.
Anticipations  of  controls  exacerbated  inflation  instability  which  in  the  end
led  to  hyperinflation  in  both  countries.
The  hyperinflations  in  Argentina  and  Brazil  in  1989  and  1990  were
different  from  traditional  hyperinflations  (such  as  those  of  Europe  in  the
1920s  and  more  recently  in  Bolivia).  The  main  difference  was  the  cause  of
these  episodes  -- traditional  hyperinflations  were  primarily  a  fiscal
phenomenon  while  in  Argentina  and  Brazil  the  non-fiscal  factors  mentioned
"  For  a  full  discussion  of  this  topic  see  Kiguel  and  Liviatan  (1990.b).30
above  were  more  important.  There  was  also  a  difference  in  the  outcomes.
Neither  Argentina  or  Brazil  succeeded  in  stopping  hyperinflation  on  its
tracks,  as  in  traditional  episodes,  despite  using  orthodox  stabilizations
programs  based  on  very  tight  monetary  policy  and  a significant  fiscal
adjustment  (of  the  type  used  in  successful  programs).
Thus  the  heterodox  era  had  added  a  new  chapter  in  the  numerous  failed
attempts  for  stopping  inflation  in  Argentina  and  Brazil.  It  teaches  that  the
heterodox  is  a  one  time  opportunity  which,  if  handled  right  and  persistently,
could  lead  to  lasting  stability  (but  not  without  costs).  The  misuse  of
controls,  on  the  other  hand,  could  destabilize  inflation  and  make
stabilization  even  more  difficult.31
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